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Abstract
This study gives an overview of bank taxation as an alternative to prudential reg-
ulations or non-revenue taxation. We review existing bank taxation with a view to
eliminating distortions in the tax system, which have incentivized banks to engage in
risky activities in the past. We focus particularly on ‘too big to be allowed to fail’
banks, which have been enjoying a competitive advantage over their smaller counter-
parts. We furthermore analyze taxation of financial instruments trading and taxation
of banking products and services and their ability to finance resolution mechanisms
for banks and to ensure their stability. In this respect, we put forward the following
arguments: (1) that a financial transaction tax is economically inefficient and poten-
tially costly for the economy and may not protect taxpayers; (2) that a bank levy is
perhaps good for financial stability to finance resolution mechanisms, but that it poses
the threat of double taxation, together with the proposed Basel III liquidity ratios;
and (3) that we support the elimination of exemption from value added tax (VAT) for
financial services in order to provide banks with a level playing field, whilst retaining
exemption for basic payments services. This is expected to improve efficiency because
it might stop the wasteful use of financial services. To avoid distortions, VAT should
be applied to all financial services, including complex ones such as derivatives. VAT
might reduce bank lending because of higher costs for customers, but arguably there
was over-borrowing prior to the financial crisis.
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1 Introduction
After the financial turmoil of 2007, policy makers, academics, and other decision-making
institutions and individuals have been discussing the ways to ‘tax’ financial institutions and
their activities in the financial markets. There are two predominant ways of taxing banks,
with the goal of improving their stability, and with a focus on dissuading them from carrying
out risky activities. One way is in the form of regulations by the supervisory authorities
and the other is imposing direct ‘fiscal’ taxes. Regulations have traditionally been the
dominant way of ensuring the stability of banks. Basel III strengthens the minimum capital
requirements required by Basel I and Basel II and introduces new regulatory requirements
in the form of bank liquidity ratios and bank leverage. This was done after the advent of
the financial turmoil of 2007, in which liquidity and leverage played an aggravating role.
Nevertheless, the ‘too big to fail’ problem is still there and has worsened since the period
before the financial crisis, especially with the merger of weaker banks with stronger ones.
This problem is unlikely to be resolved without untried special resolution regimes. Big
banks are implicitly insured by taxpayers and can raise funds more cheaply, giving them a
competitive advantage and re-enforcing their dominance. The regulatory responses, with the
view of increasing the capital and liquidity requirements for banks, with extra requirements
on big ones, may help reduce the burden on taxpayers. However, this may hinder growth
by reducing bank lending and may prove to be even costlier. Both at the global level and
within the EU, many governments have realized that on the one hand, and in contrast to
many other sectors of the economy, allowing individual banks and other systemic financial
institutions to fail may have been detrimental to the whole global economy. On the other
hand, there was no simple way for a (systemically important) bank to continue to provide
essential banking functions whilst in insolvency, and in the case of the failure of a large bank,
those functions could not simply shut down without significant systemic damage. The actions
that governments were forced to take to deal with large banking institutions in distress, such
as capital injections, guarantees and loans, did manage to stabilize the financial systems, but
in so doing, they have propped up failing institutions and supported creditors at huge costs
to public finances. The financial crisis has revealed problems with the regulatory approach
to addressing externalities arising from excessive bank risk taking and from the ‘too big to
fail’ problem. One proposal put forward to solve the issue of ‘too big to fail’ is to separate
the investment and commercial banking activities of ‘universal banks’ within bank holding
companies and to require them to operate as separately capitalized subsidiaries. In the
UK, the Banking Reform Act, which was passed on 18 December 2013, introduced a ‘ring
fence’ around retail banking, and thus around the deposits of people and small businesses,
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in line with the Independent Commission on Banking (ICB, 2011) and the Parliamentary
Commission on Banking Standards (PCBS, 2013) recommendations. The UK’s Prudential
Regulatory Authority is to consider if a US Volcker-type rule (SEC, 2013), which limits the
scope of ‘proprietary’ trading, and Hedge Fund Business a bank can undertake with the aim
of restricting the risk to which bank deposits can be exposed, is appropriate in UK. The EU
is still considering the Liikanen Report proposals (EC, 2012) for a more limited separation
of retail and investment banking compared to the UK. A less strict separation seems likely
given the long tradition of universal banking, particularly in Germany (and Switzerland).
The debate about the pros and cons of universal banks and banking, as distinct from ‘too
big to fail’, banks’ is ongoing. Calomiris (2013), for example, argues strongly that there are
significant economies of scale and scope in banking and also major benefits from the cross
border operation and competition of universal banks, whilst acknowledging, however, that
size matters and robust internationally agreed resolution regimes need to be implemented as
a back stop. Nevertheless, we see some regulatory reforms are moving in the right direction.
Keeping in mind the usefulness of regulations to ensure financial stability, we argue that this
measure should be augmented by taxation and also that a balance between regulation and
taxation should be achieved. We support Adam Smith’s argument of fairness and efficiency,
in which every entity (person or organization) should be treated equally and that this fairness
should not be at the cost of efficiency. We propose this argument in order to balance bank
regulation and taxation.
In this paper, we study how banks are regulated and taxed in different countries and
analyze how they could be taxed to achieve a balance given the overlaps between regula-
tory and revenue raising taxes, without hampering financial stability. We furthermore give
an overview of taxation of financial instruments trading (Financial Transaction Tax), taxa-
tion of financial activities (Financial Activities Tax) and taxation of banking products and
services (Value Added Tax). We highlight the ability of these taxes to finance banks’ res-
olution mechanisms, their ability to dissuade banks from carrying out risk activities and
their ability to ensure banking and hence overall financial stability because banks constitute
the biggest source of external finance in our financial system (Beck et al. (2008); Mishkin
(2012)). Therefore, banking instability can have devastating impact on overall financial
stability as was observed in the global financial crisis that started in 2007. We raise the
following arguments: first, we propose elimination of tax deductibility of the ‘expensing’ of
interest on debt, as current business tax rules encourage excessive debt. Tax deductibility of
interest expense favours debt over equity, which is in direct opposition to what regulations
require; i.e., raising extra equity to make banks safer in case of an exogenous shock. Second,
a Financial Transactions Tax (FTT) is economically inefficient because it reduces market
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trading volume and liquidity and increases volatility and the cost of capital for firms. It is
applied to the gross value at each stage of the settlement chain of a financial transaction,
unlike VAT, which is applicable at the end of the chain, and its cumulative effect of charging
each agent in a multi-step execution process can be substantial. Furthermore, the FTT may
seem like a tax on banks, but it is highly likely that its costs would be passed on to the end
investors. Third, we prefer a tax on equities such as that of UK Stamp Duty, which is differ-
ent from the FTT because it is applicable to the buying and selling of UK-registered shares
only once. The EU FTT is applicable to other non-participating member countries and to
third countries if they are counterparty to financial transaction trading in an FTT zone ju-
risdiction. However, since equities are already at a disadvantage because of the preferential
treatment of debt owing to tax deductibility of interest on debt, we make the UK Stamp
Duty model proposal with caution. Fourth, an FTT is likely to bring the ‘repo market’ to a
halt.1 European finance houses make tens of thousands of repo transactions daily to manage
their short-term liquidity, in which securities (usually government bonds) are sold for cash.
On 30th May 2013, the overnight gilt repo rate in the UK was 0.445% and the proposed EU
FTT on bonds, on both buys and sells, was 0.1%, so there would have been an almost 20%
increase in costs for each buying and selling party. The central banks, which act as a lender
of last resort, use repo transaction as a key monetary policy instrument. An FTT would not
only seriously hit liquidity management for the borrower but also adversely impact the repo
rate as a monetary policy instrument. Fifth, we propose the elimination of financial service
exemption from VAT. Given the operational difficulties linked to the removal of exemption
from VAT, the cash flow method with Tax Collection Account (TCA) proposed by Poddar
and English (1997) is recommended. Sixth, the overlap between increasing the bank levy
and the proposed Basel III Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and Net Stable Funding Ratio
(NSFR) needs to be rectified. Finally, the proposed EU FTT is likely to reduce market
liquidity and the proposed Basel III liquidity ratios may also reduce it because they require
banks to hold more liquidity on their balance sheets. This will decrease the number of buyers
in the market and this situation could cause difficulties when many banks may be seeking
to sell their liquid assets following a major event. We propose a cautious approach to the
implementation of both the FTT and the Basel III liquidity ratios.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 makes a comparison between
regulations and taxation and section 3 provides an overview of existing taxation and related
issues. Section 4 discusses the taxation of financial instruments and section 5 provides the
summary and conclusion of the paper.
1Repo is the sale of securities with an agreement to repurchase them back at an agreed higher price at a
later date. The difference between the original price and the higher repurchase price is called the repo rate.
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2 Regulations and Taxation
The IMF (2010) proposes the use of taxes and regulations to counteract micro- and macro-
prudential risk in the financial system. Although regulations have traditionally been domi-
nant to ensure banking stability, their focus has primarily been on micro-prudential regula-
tion and supervision. The crisis has emphasized the need for a macro prudential framework
that can address systemic risks and hence focus on the stability of the financial system.
We portray the taxation of banks as a macro-prudential regulation. This idea of using reg-
ulatory and other policy measures, including the implementation of taxes and surcharge,
is not new and has been pursued by policy makers around the world for some time. For
instance, a number of Asian countries have long used restrictions on loan-to-value ratios,
capital inflows and other ad hoc measures to limit internal or external vulnerabilities. Over
a decade ago, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) proposed marrying the micro-
and macro-prudential dimensions of financial stability in a speech by its general manager
(Andrew Crockett) that proved prescient (Crockett, 2000).
Keen (2011) presents an interesting debate over the choice of taxation or regulation as
a measure to attain the stability of a financial system. He lists the following factors that
can help balance tax and regulatory measures: Income effects, Uncertainty, Asymmetric
information, and Institutional issues.
1. Income effects: Taxation strengthens public buffers to address bank failure and cri-
sis, whereas regulation focuses on private buffers. For strongly correlated negative
shocks, public buffers provide a useful risk-pooling role and reduce the incidence of
bank failures. However, for strongly positively correlated shocks across institutions,
the benefit of risk pooling and economy of scale disappears. Taxation is more beneficial
in dealing with macro-prudential risks, whereas regulation, while leaving institutions
to respond appropriately to systemic crises, may enable a more robust response to
macro- prudential concerns.
2. Uncertainty: The comparison between taxation and regulation depends on the shape
of private marginal cost (PMC) and marginal external benefit (MEB), as demonstrated
by (Weitzman, 1974). If the externalities are small, taxation will dominate (the MEB
curve then being horizontal, at zero). However, in the case of a major bank failure,
regulation is preferred because the external cost of failure exceeds the private benefits.
3. Asymmetric Information: There is information asymmetry between the policy makers
and the management of financial institutions with regard to the riskiness of their fi-
nancial affairs, as well as the quality of their management. Banks differ in their ability
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to manage risk and to set up an optimal policy. In this case, a minimum capital re-
quirement is useful to limit the risk taking ability of banks. However, nonlinear tax,
with an increasing marginal rate on bank borrowing, can still be helpful.
4. Institutional Issues: As far as regulations are concerned, there have been some coordi-
nated efforts towards the implementation of regulations at the global level; for example,
Basel III. However, there has been little global effort to coordinate the enforcement
of taxation. Nevertheless, there have been unilateral taxation innovations in differ-
ent parts of the world. Recently, the European Parliament has taken an initiative to
ask banks to report a breakdown of the taxes they pay in different jurisdictions; it is
expected that the same practice will be implemented worldwide.
de Nicolo et al. (2012) study the impact of bank regulation and taxation in a dynamic
setting, in which banks are exposed to capital and liquidity risk. They find that capital
requirements can mitigate banks incentives to take on the excessive risk induced by deposit
insurance and limited liability, and can increase efficiency and welfare. By contrast, liquidity
requirements significantly reduce lending, efficiency and welfare. If these requirements are
too strict, then the benefits of regulation disappear, and the associated efficiency and social
costs may be significant. On taxation, corporate income taxes generate higher government
revenues and entail lower efficiency and welfare costs than taxes on non-deposit liabilities.
Coulter et al. (2012) argue that taxation and regulation are fundamentally the same; however,
if taxes are paid ex ante, unless they are pure capital, the double-edged aspect of taxation
arises.
Banks have been subject to regulations in the form of Basel I and Basel II, yet these
regulations were not able to prevent banks from taking excessive risk and hence finding
themselves on the verge of collapse, forcing governments to either let them fail or bail them
out. The present crisis is a testimony to the failure of Basel II. Basel II consisted of three
pillars: a minimum capital requirement, a supervisory review and market discipline. One
of the major elements of calculation of credit risk is the assessment of risk-weighted assets.2
The idea is that some assets are riskier than others and that banks should hold more capital
against risk assets. There are two problems attached to this: the calculation of risk weights
in this way is backward looking and assumes that securities that have been riskier in the
past will continue to be riskier in the future. In addition, it does not adequately assess the
risk inherent in different sovereign bonds. For example, lending to ‘triple A’ rated sovereign
states carries a risk weight of zero. Because Greece was part of the European Union, the
bonds issued by the Greek Government carried the same weight as those issued by their
2Risk weighting of assets is also a core element of Basel III.
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German counterpart. The problem with this approach became evident with the onset of
the Eurozone crisis in 2010, after which Greek Government bonds were recognized as having
higher risk weights than German ones. This led to the crisis in Greece because the value
of a one-year bond at the time in Greece was less than the value of a one-year bond in
Germany. Further, banks with similar portfolios can use quite different risk weights. The
regulations allow big banks with large trading books to use their own internal models to
determine the riskiness of their portfolio and to hold capital based on their own models. On
the other hand, there are explicit capital requirements for traditional loans. Consequently,
bigger banks with large trading books can have proportionately less capital and still report
higher capital ratios, compared to smaller banks whose portfolios contain mostly traditional
loans. Furthermore, the preferred approach for the calculation of market risk was value-at-
risk (VaR).3 Taleb (2010) makes a valid point about the ignorance of 1% distribution, where
most of the interesting events happen. Joe Nocera, in his article on risk management in
The New York Times in 2009 (2 January 2009:p.7), explains that the whole value-at-risk
structure gives banks incentives to push risk into the ‘tails’ of the statistical distribution,
which essentially fattens them, significantly increasing bank risk. Therefore, it is important
from the risk management point of view that we know the ‘tail risks’ of banks. One other
measure called ‘expected shortfall’ gives better incentives to trades. Whilst VaR aims to
demonstrate “how bad things can get”, expected shortfall asks: “if things go bad, what is
the expected loss?” (Hull, 2012).4
Basel III requires banks to increase their capital reserve requirement in order to protect
the banking system when there is an adverse shock. Such reserves help address the moral
hazard problem created by deposit insurance and also help reduce the information asymme-
try problems between the bank management and depositors. Without a minimum capital
requirement, banks might maintain socially sub-optimal capital.
Cosimano and Hakura (2011) argue that a lower debt-to-equity ratio will increase the
borrowing costs of banks. They show that a 1.3% increase in the required equity-to-debt
ratio will increase loan rates by 16 basis points. However, this contrasts with the Modigliani
and Miller (1958) theory, which concludes that an increase in equity is offset by a reduction
in the cost of debt due to the lower risk of bankruptcy.
3Value-at-risk (VaR) is a statistical model that gives the probability of certainty (X%) that more than a
certain amount of dollars will not be lost in the next N days. For example, if we have $10 million of daily
VaR with a 99% confidence interval, it means that we are 99% confident that we will not lose more than $10
million today.
4Expected shortfall is the expected loss in an N-day given that the loss exceeds the Xth percentile of the
loss distribution.
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Cosimano and Hakura (2011) also highlight the asymmetric effects of an increase in the
equity-to-asset ratio for countries experiencing a crisis and those that are not. They show
that the effect is much higher for countries not in crisis; for example, a 1.3% increase in
the equity-to-asset ratio results in a 14.8% reduction in loans for these countries, compared
to a reduction of 4.6% for those not in crisis. There is no incentive for the latter countries
to increase their equity-to-debt ratio and the success of Basel III can be at stake in such
a situation. Furthermore, as highlighted by Mullineux (2012), the increased emphasis on
core equity will put the small saving banks at a disadvantage because they cannot issue
equity. However, this can be regarded as a reduction in the idiosyncratic risk of less sophis-
ticated banks. Nonetheless, Zhou (2010) argues that the diversification of idiosyncratic risk
increases systemic risk. While Basel III requires higher capital requirements, AAA to A-
rated sovereign exposures still carry a zero risk-weight. Furthermore, the risk weighting of
mortgage assets, which are considered to have been the primary cause of the global financial
crisis of 2007-08, is still based on the internal ratings of banks. de Mooij et al. (2013) show
that higher aggregate bank leverage is associated with a significantly greater chance of crisis.
One of the issues, which the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards (PCBS, 2013)
highlights in its 2013 report, is that the Basel III proposed leverage ratio of 3% is too low,
and that it should be substantially higher than this level.5 Sir Mervyn King, Governor of
the Bank of England, supported a leverage ratio of 10 to 20% and Andy Haldane (Director
of Financial Stability of the Bank of England) stated that a 4% leverage ratio would be
much too low to prevent some banks from failing.6 Meanwhile, Admati and Hellwing (2013)
favour an equity ratio of 30% or more and argue that it will not reduce the lending capacity
of banks; rather, this will increase because banks will become less risky and be able to raise
equity more cheaply from the capital market. One other important aspect concerning the
leverage ratio is that because it is implemented on a gross and non-weighted basis, it would
encourage banks to increase their exposure to high-risk, high-return lending and would thus
potentially increase their risk exposures and lending to SMEs, inter alia, helping to overcome
the credit crunch perhaps. The parallel Basel risk-weighted capital adequacy requirements
would limit this tendency, however.
While micro-prudential supervision focuses on individual institutions, macro-prudential
supervision aims to mitigate risks to the financial system as a whole (‘systemic risks’). The
Bank of England (2009) highlighted that macro-prudential policy was missing in the pre-
vailing policy framework and the gap between macro-prudential policy and micro-prudential
5Note that there is a difference between leverage ratio and RWA (Risk Weighted Assets) capital ratios.
Leverage ratio is the ratio of tier 1 capital to average total assets, whereas RWA tier 1 capital ratio is the
tier 1 capital divided by the risk weighted assets. RWA are the assets weighted according to their risk.
6PCBS (2013) report entitled “Changing Banking for Good”.
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supervision had widened over the previous decade. After the advent of the 2007 financial
crisis, improved measures to ‘tax’ banks have been devised to measure the macro-economic
impact of the financial institutions. These include: Conditional Value-at-Risk (CoVaR),
by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2008); Systemic Expected Shortfall (SES), by Acharya et al.
(2010), proposing a tax on the default risk of a bank; and the Market-based tax by Hart and
Zingales (2009), proposing a bank tax on the value of credit default swap contracts.
Macro-prudential supervision focuses on reducing asset price inflation, and thus the need
to insure against bank failure; it hence protects taxpayers from the need for bail-outs. Addi-
tional macro- prudential tools have been proposed to counter the procyclicality of the bank-
ing system and risk-related capital adequacy and backward looking provisioning against bad
and doubtful debts. Examples of these are a cap on loan-to-value and debt-to-income ratios,
countercyclical capital and liquidity requirements, and non-risk related capital (‘leverage’)
ratios; a levy on the outstanding debt multiplied with a factor of average time-to-maturity
of a bank; and a levy on non-core liabilities (Perotti and Suarez (2009); Shin (2011); Han-
son et al. (2011)). Other tools include pre-funded deposit insurance and resolution. These
instruments are largely untried and untested as yet, although the US Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Fund, which collects risk-related insurance premia from banks and serves as a resolution
fund for banks that are not too big to fail, and may it be politically difficult to limit access
to mortgage finance through loan-to-value or loan-to-income ratios in practice.
The Eurozone countries reached an agreement on 18 December 2013 to form a ‘Banking
Union’ that will supervise and manage the resolution of the banks in Eurozone member
countries. A Banking Union has three pillars: a ‘common banking supervisor’, a ‘Single Res-
olution Mechanism (SRM)’ and a ‘common deposit guarantee’. It is a step toward uniform
bank supervision, to be coordinated and overseen by the European Central Bank (ECB).
There is a proposal to use a bank levy to build up, over a number of years, a Bank Recovery
and Resolution Fund. The aim is to protect taxpayers from having to bail out banks. To
achieve this, however, a very large, potentially normally idle, fund would be required. In
the US the FDIC is underwritten by the Treasury and cannot afford to resolve the problems
of large banks. We propose that the UK use its Bank Levy to establish pre-funded deposit
guarantee and resolution funds to make the recently enacted ‘depositor preference’, or debt
seniority over all bond holders, a reality. The UK Banking Reform Act and EU Banking
Union agreement enact depositor preference, and provide for ‘bail-ins’ of junior and senior
bondholders in accordance with credit standings; this means that the bondholders have to
share losses in accordance with their credit seniority once shareholders have taken their
losses before government assistance to rescue banks is provided. Mullineux (2013) consid-
ers options for protecting taxpayers, but notes that financial stability is a public good and
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hence some taxpayer contribution to its provision might be expected, given the potentially
high opportunity cost of maintaining very large, normally idle, deposit guarantee and bank
resolution funds. These insurance funds can be smaller if the size (and perhaps complex-
ity) of the insured banks, or banking subsidiaries, is reduced. Alongside the re-regulation,
interest in financial sector taxation is increasing. The European Commissions report (EC,
2010)on financial sector taxation puts forward three arguments in favour of the use of taxa-
tion. They consider taxation, in addition to regulations, to be a corrective measure to reduce
the risk taking activities by the financial sector. Secondly, it is a source of revenue through
which banks, underpinned by taxpayers, can make a fair contribution to public finances, and
thirdly, it is also a source of funding for the resolution of failed banks. However, studies
such as those of Shaviro (2011) and Ceriani et al. (2011) have argued that taxes have the
potential to exacerbate behaviours that may have contributed to the crisis. For instance, tax
rules encouraging excessive debt, complex financial transactions, poorly designed incentive
compensation for corporate managers and highly leveraged home-ownership may have all
contributed to the crisis. Therefore, even though taxes have not been among the primary
causes of the crisis, they may have aggravated it. Because firms can deduct interest expenses
from their payable taxes, this gives a tax advantage to debt finance. This is termed as ‘debt
bias’ in the public finance literature (Auerbach and Gordon, 2002). There is a view that high
leverage of banks might have worsened the crisis, but not caused it. Gu et al. (2012), among
others, describe the choice of subsidiaries by multinationals based on the tax structure in
different countries.7 Multinationals go for debt finance for their subsidiaries in high tax
countries because of interest tax deductibility, whereas they go for equity finance in low tax
countries because of the low tax on operating income. It may not be illegal to be involved in
such a practice, but it definitely reveals the urge of multinationals to earn profits by taking
advantage of the taxation system.
Ceriani et al. (2011) consider the taxation of residential buildings and the deductibility of
mortgage interest, the taxation of stock options and other performance-based remuneration,
and the interaction between securitization and the tax system. They argue that three kinds
of taxation contributed to the global financial crisis. Many commentators have argued that
the housing policies pursued in the US over the fifteen years prior to the crisis were partly to
blame for it, particularly the repeal of capital gains taxation on home selling through the 1997
Tax Relief Act. In the US there is evidence of preferential tax treatment on the employers
side, which may have contributed to the success of stock-based remuneration plans. Stock
7Hines and Jr. (1990) and Mills and Newberry (2004) find that multinationals do take into consideration
tax differences when deciding about their subsidiaries’ capital structure. In Europe, Huizinga et al. (2008)
and Egger et al. (2010) report similar results.
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options, nevertheless, force managers to go for short-term profits instead of having a long-
term focus. Furthermore, Ceriani et al. (2011) argue that securitization creates opportunities
for tax arbitrage and reduces the total tax paid by the originator, the special purpose vehicle
(SPV) and the final investor. Because of tax differences in different countries, the SPV may
be a tax-free vehicle under foreign law. The SPV offsets incomes that are otherwise taxed
at a different rate by pooling interest incomes, capital gains and losses. It also defers the
tax until the SPV distributes incomes on the securities it has issued or profits are realized.
This leads us to evaluate the existing taxes and related issues, which are discussed at length
in the following section.
3 An Overview of Existing Taxation and Related Is-
sues
Next, we undertake a comprehensive overview of the existing tax regimes applied to the
financial sector. Following the EC (2011), we analyze four different tax areas: Corporate
Income Tax, Labour Taxation, Value-Added Tax and the taxation of financial instruments.
Bank levies or bank tax are also analyzed.
3.1 Corporate Income Tax
There are two main differences between financial and non-financial corporations. These con-
cern the treatment of bad and doubtful loans and the non-application of thin capitalization
rules to the financial sector. As far as bad and doubtful loans are concerned, the differential
treatment may provide a cash-flow (liquidity) advantage, but not a tax advantage. These
differences in treatment can be attributed to the structure of the business in the financial
sector, for which interest received and paid constitute part of the business and not just the
financing activities. Before the crisis of 2007-2009, the financial sector accounted for a sub-
stantial share of corporate tax receipts. The values for the EU27 are similar to those for many
non-EU G20 countries: about one quarter in Canada, Italy and Turkey and about a fifth in
Australia, France, the UK and US. Given the weight and the above-average profitability of
this sector in general, this should not come as a surprise.
3.2 Specific Anti-Avoidance Rules or Debt Bias
In order to reduce the tax due, companies utilize the applicable tax regime to their advantage.
For example, companies can choose to be funded via equity or debt. Debt financing generally
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brings additional tax benefits compared to equity financing, considering the fact that interest
expenses are generally tax-deductible (whereas dividends are distributed after tax and hence
are not deductible). Therefore, by means of high debt financing, the tax base may be eroded
through interest expenses.
de Mooij et al. (2013) show that debt bias is associated with higher bank leverage,
which in turn is associated with crisis. PCBS (2013) explains that the tax system provides
a disincentive for banks to hold capital in its highest quality form of equity; rather, it
encourages the holding of capital in hybrid, debt related, instruments. Although hybrid
instruments can be part of a banks overall capital, they are less loss absorbent than pure
equity. The IMF (2010) argues that debt financing could in principle be offset by taxes
at a personal level - relatively light taxation of capital gains favours equity, for instance.
However, in reality, the importance of tax-exempt and non-resident investors, the prevalence
of avoidance schemes focused on creating interest deductions, and the common discourse of
market participants suggest that debt is often strongly tax-favoured. In fact, Weichenrieder
and Klautke (2008) show that debt biasness leads to noticeably higher leverage for non-
financial companies. Moreover, the proliferation prior to the crisis of hybrid instruments such
as Trust Preferred Securities (Engel et al., 1999) benefiting from interest rate ‘deductibility’
or expensing, yet allowable (subject to limits prescribed by Basel) as regulatory capital,
strongly suggests tax incentives at work that conflict with regulatory intentions.
3.2.1 Thin Capitalization Rules
To limit risk in the case of excessive debt financing (solvency risk for creditors) and so
minimize the adverse tax consequences of excessive interest deductions, several countries
have set up ‘thin capitalization rules’ or rules ‘limiting interest deductions’. These rules deny
interest deduction once debt ratios or interest payment exceeds some threshold. In other
words, thin capitalization rules determine how much of the interest paid on corporate debt
is deductible for tax purposes, thus limiting the amount of interest deduction when a certain
debt-equity ratio is exceeded. In certain countries, for example in the Netherlands, rules also
provide for a limitation of interest expenses, for instance when they exceed interest income.
Countries where the thin capitalization rules apply may be divided into three categories:
1. Countries such as Austria, Germany, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal,
and the USA in which thin capitalization rules apply in the same way to the banking
sector as to other sectors.
2. Countries such as Czech Republic, Hungary, Switzerland, the UK, and China in which
the thin capitalization rules apply to banks, but in a different way. The difference could
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be for various reasons. For instance, it may be in the applicable debt-to-equity ratio.
For example, in China and Czech Republic, the debt-to-equity ratio applicable to banks
is higher. Alternatively, the difference may also be present in the borrowings, which
have to be taken into account to compute the debt-to-equity ratio. For instance, in
Hungary banks do not have take into account their liabilities in connection with their
financial services activities, and in the UK a group’s external borrowings are not taken
into account to determine the debt cap restriction. The EC (2011) report states that
these differences are due to the nature of the activities of a bank.
3. Countries such as Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Greece, Latvia, Romania, Slovenia, and
Spain in which banks are excluded from the thin capitalization rules. In Germany, thin
capitalization rules are similar for banks and companies in other sectors. In practice,
however, due to the fact that interest expenses are always deductible to the extent
they do not exceed interest income earned, banks will not be burdened by the thin
capitalization rules in this country.
3.2.2 A Comprehensive Business Income Tax (CBIT)
The IMF (2010) proposes a CBIT, which would deny interest deductibility for CIT altogether.
Similarly, it would exempt interest received (to avoid multiple taxation within the corporate
sector). Although CBIT would also result in financial institutions paying little or no CIT
(having no tax due on interest received, but non-interest deductible costs), in aggregate
this might be more than offset by increased payments by other companies. The transitional
problems in moving to a CBIT would be significant, especially when debt is issued in full
expectation of deductibility.
3.2.3 An Allowance for Corporate Equity (ACE)
Certain countries may also apply positive incentive rules from a tax perspective to encourage
companies to increase equity funding. Under an ACE scheme, companies would retain
interest deductibility but also provide a deduction for a notional return on equity. For
instance, Brazil has had a CIT with these features for many years. Austria, Croatia and Italy
have all had CITs with an element of an ACE. Belgium has recently introduced a notional
interest deduction regime, which mainly consists of a tax deduction corresponding to a
notional interest cost computed on adjusted equity capital. This regime was introduced with
the aim to (re-) equilibrate the tax treatment of equity funded and debt funded companies.
Several studies, such as those of Staderini (2001), Princen (2010) and Klemm (2007), have
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reviewed the wider experience with ACE and provided evidence that such schemes have
indeed reduced debt financing.8
Although the adoption of an ACE would mean a revenue loss, the IMF (2010) argues that
transitional provisions can limit this. Moreover, the gain would also be less for financial firms
than others, since they tend to be much more highly geared. The use of ACE can further
be limited by applying the same notional return (which strong arguments suggest should
approximate some risk-free return) to equity as well as debt. This would have the further
advantage of eliminating any distinction between debt and equity for tax purposes. de Mooij
et al. (2013) also support an allowance for corporate equity, by providing a deduction for the
normal return to equity to eliminate the debt bias.
3.2.4 Other Anti-Avoidance Rules
Not all countries have anti-avoidance rules. It should be noted that those where domestic
legislation does set down such rules, these generally apply to all companies, and thus not
specifically or solely to banks. In this regard, only the US has reported certain specific anti-
avoidance rules applying to the Financial Sector, and thus to banks (many relate to profit
off-shoring). The case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union has set stringent
regulations for the application of these rules.
To summarize, very few countries have enacted specific tax rules to limit interest deduc-
tions by banks, probably because of the fact that accepting deposits from customers (and
granting loans), coupled with the payment of interest on those deposits, is the core activity
of the banking sector. Therefore, there is little tax incentive attached to the deduction of
interest payments, as they are more a business characteristic inherent in the financial sector,
especially banks.
Moreover, the EC (2010) report states that at least one country also explicitly referred to
applicable capital requirements from a regulatory perspective, under which banks’ funding
should be sufficiently regulated in principle and hence no further corrective measures (from
a tax perspective) need to be undertaken in this respect. Such regulatory provisions (such
as Basel I, Basel II and the EU Capital Requirements Directive reflecting Basel II) are
intended to create an international standard that banking regulators can use to determine the
capital/resources banks need to have to protect them against the financial and operational
risks they face.
Lastly, the application of the above reforms to financial institutions might seem tempt-
ing. However, they would create tax arbitrage opportunities. For instance, providing ACE
treatment only for financial firms would require anti-avoidance rules to prevent non-financial
8An overview of the design issues of ACE can be found in OECD (2007) and IMF (2009).
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business being conducted by them. Moreover, changes to personal taxation may also be
needed along with these reforms. Therefore, although these reforms would be difficult, the
payoff from reducing the fundamental bias to excess leverage could be substantial.
3.3 Labour Taxation
There are generally no differences in the treatment of the personal income of workers em-
ployed in the financial sector, except for the introduction of a special bonus tax (albeit
temporary for some EU member states) on financial sector employees. A special enhanced
tax on bonuses would lead to higher tax rates than personal income taxation alone. In a lim-
ited number of countries, stock options and bonuses benefit from a favourable tax treatment,
but this treatment is available across all sectors.
Using a novel database of executive directors for the period 2002-2007 for both EU and
non-EU countries, Egger et al. (2012) show that there is a significant earnings premium in
the financial sector, which for the overall sample available (including both EU and non-
EU countries) amounts to about 40% after conditioning out observable director-specific and
firm-specific characteristics. Nevertheless, considerable heterogeneity of earnings across dif-
ferent types of businesses within the financial sector exists. In fact, one should expect that
compensation levels differ sharply between more conservative commercial banks and riskier
investment companies. Using the conservative commercial banks as a reference point, they
show that individuals in the real estate sector, the insurance sector and a number of other
financial businesses earn significantly higher compensation. This finding holds true for the
whole sample, as well as for the EU one.
For the US, Philippon and Reshef (2009) use detailed data on wages in the country’s
financial sector between 1930 and 2006 to identify the existence of economic rents in the
sector, which can explain the wage differential of 30 to 50% They provide evidence that
these wages reached excessively high levels, especially around 1930 and between 1995 and
2006. On one hand, their results suggest that complex corporate activities such as Initial
Public Offerings (IPO) or credit risk have a positive effect on the demand for skilled workers,
whereas on the other hand, stricter regulation has a negative effect on the demand for skilled
workers.
4 Taxation of Financial Instruments
The IMF (2010) argues that there may be reasons to consider additional tax measures
beyond a levy. This is because the large fiscal, economic, and social costs of financial
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crises may suggest a contribution of the financial sector to general revenues beyond covering
the fiscal costs of direct support. Moreover, taxes might have a role in correcting adverse
externalities arising from the financial sector, such as the creation of systemic risks and
excessive risk taking. Specifically, proposals include taxes on short-term and/or foreign
exchange borrowing; on high rates of return (to offset any tendency for decision takers to
attach too little weight to downside outcomes); and for corrective taxes related to the notions
of systemic risks and interconnectedness. The underlying belief or assumption is that receipts
from these taxes would go to general revenue, although they need not equal the damage
however defined that they seek to limit or avert.9 Needless to mention, explicitly corrective
taxes (on systemic risk, for instance) would need to be considered in close coordination
with regulatory changes (such as additional capital requirements for systemically important
institutions).
The remainder of this section focuses on two possible instruments directed primarily to
revenue-raising, although in each case their behavioural, and hence potentially corrective,
impact cannot be ignored.10
4.1 Financial Transactions Tax (FTT)
From the beginning of the financial crisis, the design and implementation of an FTT has
received much attention from various circles of society, including the ‘occupy’ protesters,
policy makers and academics. According to the EC (2010) report, the financial sector might
be too large and take excessive risks because of actual or expected state support. As a result,
the financial market is very volatile and this creates negative external effects for the rest of
the economy. The Commission argues that an FTT might be used as a corrective tool for
the existence of this moral hazard, thereby enhancing the potential efficiency and stability
of financial markets.
The IMF (2010) argues that suggestions for some form of FTT differ, including its goals
and degrees of detail. For instance, one particular form is a ‘Tobin tax’ on foreign exchange
transactions. This would be an internationally uniform tax on all spot conversions of one cur-
rency into another, proportional to the size of the transaction. The underlying presumption
is that the tax would in particular deter short-term financial ‘round trip’ currency conver-
sions. Tobin (1958) proposes that each government would administrate the tax over its own
jurisdiction and the tax revenues could be paid to the IMF or World Bank. Although he
9The reason is that corrective taxes need to address the marginal social damage from some activity, which
may differ from the average damage.
10The EC (2010) reports other possibilities, including for instance a surcharge on the rate of corporate
income tax applied to financial institutions.
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recognizes that “ingenious patterns of evasion” would occur as a result of the tax, he argues
that the benefit would outweigh the costs. He postulates that the disadvantages are small
compared to the macroeconomic costs of the current system (inefficient national monetary
policies at that time).
Tobin’s proposal on exchange rates and the efficiency of monetary policies remains very
informative for today’s debate on a general FTT. As the IMF (2010) states, the common
feature focused on here is the applicability of the tax to a very wide range of transactions.
More specifically, FTT would be applied to all financial transactions and particularly to those
carried out in organized markets (Schamp, 2011). The EC (2010) states that it would be
levied each time the underlying asset is traded at a relatively low statutory rate. Advocates
of FTT argue that its implementation could raise substantial amounts: it has been estimated
that a tax of one basis point would raise over $200 billion annually if levied globally on stocks,
bonds and derivative transactions, and a 0.5 basis point Tobin tax on spot and derivative
transactions in the four major trading currencies would raise $20-$40 billion IMF (2010).
Moreover, Schulmeister et al. (2008) estimate that the revenue of a global FTT would amount
to 1.52% of world GDP at a tax rate of 0.1%. On the other hand, it is estimated that in
Europe tax revenues would be 2.1% of GDP if a similar tax were imposed.11
Nevertheless, FTT should not be dismissed on the grounds of administrative practicality.
In fact, as the IMF (2010) notes, most G20 countries already tax some financial transac-
tions. For instance, Argentina, which has the broadest coverage, taxes payments into and
from current accounts, and in Turkey, all the receipts of banks and insurance companies
are taxed. Other countries charge particular financial transactions, such as the 0.5% stamp
duty on locally registered shares in the United Kingdom. As experience with UK stamp
duty shows, collecting taxes on a wide range of exchange-traded securities (and, possibly,
derivatives) could be straightforward and cheap if levied through central clearing mecha-
nisms. Of course, to implement transaction taxes more generally, the widespread use of
several clearance and settlement systems is certainly helpful. Nevertheless, some important
practical issues have not yet been fully resolved. For instance, the question as to whether
such a tax might drive transactions into less secure channels remains unanswered. However,
implementation difficulties are not unique to the FTT, and a sufficient basis exists for practi-
cal implementation of at least some form of FTT to focus on the central question of whether
11It should be noted that the revenue potential of financial transaction taxes will inter-alia depend on
their impact on trading volumes. For the estimates discussed, a ‘medium transaction-reduction-scenario’ is
assumed. In that situation, Schulmeister (2011) assumes that the volume of spot transactions in the stock
and bond market would decline by 10% and 5% respectively. Moreover, the reduction in trading volume of
exchange-traded derivatives as well as of over-the-counter (OTC) transactions would lie between 60 and 70%
(Schulmeister et al., 2008)
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such a tax would be desirable in principle.
France and Italy introduced an FTT on 1 August 2012 and 1 March 2013 respectively.
The FTT in France is a tax on equity transactions, high frequency trading in equities, and
naked exposure in CDS in EU sovereign debt. In Italy, the FTT is broader in scope and taxes
equities, equity-like financial instruments and derivatives, as well as high frequency trading.
The FTT in France is quite similar to UK stamp duty, apart from the rate of 0.2% (which
was 0.1% before February 2013), the exclusion of companies with a market capitalization of
less than 1 billion, and the fact that it is applied at the time of settlement, as opposed to
the ‘buy side’ transaction in the case of UK stamp duty. Furthermore, the French FTT also
taxes high frequency trading in equities and naked exposures CDS exposures in EU sovereign
debt.
Current evidence shows that the FTT in France and Italy has reduced volume and liq-
uidity in the market and has increased volatility. The French FTT has also failed to raise the
expected revenue due to reduction in the volume of over-the-counter OTC transactions. The
EU FTT is broader, in the sense that it taxes cash and derivatives across all asset classes,
with the exception of spot foreign exchange. The EU FTT is 0.1% on stock and bond trades
and 0.01% on derivatives. It is applicable on any transaction involving one financial insti-
tution with its headquarters in the tax area, or trading on behalf of a client based in the
tax area. Critics are of the view that such a general tax will stop the repo market because
of taxes on both buy and sell legs. Repo has an important role and helps in the clearing of
activities, collateralization of payments between banks, and provision of market liquidity for
smaller currency areas.
4.1.1 Some advantages and disadvantages of implementing an FTT
12 Advantages of an FTT Proponents of an FTT argue that its implementation has
significant revenue potential. However, the actual amount raised greatly depends on the
design of the tax. For instance, the level of collection has a major influence on revenue raised
Schamp (2011). Therefore, tax collection at the level of the trading markets would target only
a small proportion of financial transactions, given the fragmentation of the trading landscape
and the growing importance of OTC derivatives (United Nations, 2010). In addition, tax
revenue depends on the base and rate of the FTT. Nevertheless, the United Nation’s high-
level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing (AGF) calculated that the amount of
revenue is significant, even with a very low tax rate.
Moreover, an FTT is an innovative source of financing (Schamp, 2011). This means that
no money is extracted from other budgets. Therefore, the considerable revenues collected
12See Schamp (2011) for more details.
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could be used for the achievement of policy goals on a supranational level. For instance,
global public goods, such as development aid or climate control, could be financed (Schamp,
2011). Unquestionably, the implementation of an FTT is accompanied by administrative,
monitoring and collection costs. However, as discussed previously with regard to the ex-
perience in the United Kingdom, if the tax is properly designed, then the administrative
costs can be negligible. For instance, in the UK a tax is levied on electronic paperless share
transactions, called the Stamp Duty Reserve Tax. In this case, collection is made through
the electronic transaction system of the London Stock Exchange and the cost is remarkably
low, i.e. 0.2 pence per pound sterling of revenue collected (Schamp, 2011).
In fact, Schamp (2011) argues that the implementation of the FTT is rather simple
and that it could be operational quickly. Moreover, the proposed FTT can build on past
experiences of transaction taxes and financial infrastructures, which can operate as central
points. To conclude, as the UN (2010) states, in this respect “the implementation of an
FTT is not a question of feasibility, although strong will is necessary to oppose traditional
objectives” (United Nations, 2010:p.6). In fact, during the G20 summit in Toronto, the
ministers decided that a global FTT was no longer feasible.
Disadvantages of an FTT. The IMF (2010) argues that an FTT is ‘not the best way
to finance a resolution mechanism’ as the volume of transactions is not a good proxy for
either the benefits it conveys to particular institutions or the costs they are likely to impose
on it. Moreover, it is not focused on the core sources of financial instability, as it would not
target any of the key attributes - institution size, interconnectedness, and substitutability -
that give rise to systemic risk. However, adjusting the tax rate to reflect such considerations
would be possible in principle, but highly complex in practice. The IMF (2010) states that if
the aim is to discourage particular types of transactions, this could be done more effectively
by taxing or regulating them directly.
Moreover, (Schamp, 2011) notes that if the implementation of an FTT were limited to a
few jurisdictions, it would be unlikely to raise the revenue sought. Moreover, avoidance of
the trading market subject to the transaction tax would result in a substantial decrease in
the tax base. Nevertheless, the United Nations (2010) and Cortez and Vogel (2011) argue
that the implementation of an FTT in all major financial centres would be sufficient to
prevent avoidance, as liquidity and legal requirements are still decisive factors and in many
tax havens transaction costs are much higher compared to industrialized countries. Besides,
a global basis is needed to ensure a worldwide playing field for global financial players.
Even if an FTT were implemented, (Schamp, 2011) argues that it is likely that investors
would demand a higher minimum rate of return on their investment, given the rise in trans-
action costs and hence the expectation of a decrease in future profits. Since the cost of
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capital for a company is determined by the minimum rate of return demanded by investors,
the introduction of an FTT might mean an increase in the cost of capital faced by compa-
nies. Therefore, the impact of the FTT on a company’s cost of capital will depend positively
on the frequency with which its equity securities are traded. For this scenario, Bond et al.
(2004) find that after stamp duty in the UK was halved in 1986, share price increases de-
pended positively on market turnover. As a consequence of the increased cost of capital,
fewer investment projects will be profitable, and hence investment and economic growth in
the economy will be hampered (Schamp, 2011). However, Cortez and Vogel (2011) argue
that the increase in the cost of capital could be restricted if the government issued fewer
bonds as a result of the additional revenue raised by the FTT. This in turn would increase
the demand for non-government securities and consequently increase the rate of return on
non-government securities. However, the assumption that government would behave in such
a fashion is not certain.
Most importantly, the real burden of an FTT may fall largely on final consumers rather
than, as often seems to be supposed, earnings in the financial sector. Although, undoubtedly,
some would be borne by the owners and managers of financial institutions, a large part of
this burden may well be passed on to the users of financial services (both businesses and
individuals) in the form of reduced returns on savings, higher costs of borrowing, and/or
increases in final commodity prices.13 According to the IMF (2010), this is because the
FTT is levied on every transaction; the cumulative, ‘cascading’ effects of an FTT - a tax
charged on values that reflect the payment of tax at earlier stages - can be significant and
non-transparent. Moreover, it is not obvious that the incidence would fall mainly on either
the better-off or financial sector rents.14 Therefore, to summarize, since the incidence of an
FTT remains unclear, it should not be thought of as a well-targeted way of taxing any rents
earned in the financial sector.
Besides, the IMF (2010) argues that care should be taken in assessing the potential
efficiency of an FTT in raising revenue as15:
One of the weaknesses of an FTT is that it taxes transactions between businesses, in-
cluding indirectly through the impact on the prices of non-financial products. Therefore,
the argument that an FTT would cause little distortion because it would be levied at a very
low rate on a very broad base is not very persuasive. In fact, a central principle of public fi-
13Schwert and Seguin (1993) estimate that a 0.5% securities transaction tax in the U.S. would increase
the cost of capital by 10-18 basis points.
14Although most current proponents of an FTT do not envisage that its base would include current account
bank transactions, it is cautionary to recall that while some have advocated this as a relatively progressive
form of taxation, such evidence as there is suggests the opposite Arbela´ez et al. (2005).
15See Schmidt (2007), Schulmeister et al. (2008), and Spratt (2006) for further details.
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nance is that if the sole policy objective is to raise revenue, then taxing transactions between
businesses (which many financial transactions are) is unwise. Therefore, distorting business
decisions may reduce total output, whilst taxing profits from that output directly could raise
more taxes. Technically, a tax levied on transactions at one stage ‘cascades’ into prices at
all further stages of production. Hence, for instance, most countries have found that VAT
which effectively excludes transactions between businesses is a more efficient revenue-raiser
than turnover taxes.16 As far as pure revenue-raising terms are concerned, there are more
efficient instruments than an FTT.
Even if the question of whether transactions could, or would, escape the tax if imposed
only by a few countries, experience shows that financial transactions seem to be particularly
vulnerable to avoidance or evasion. For instance, in the United Kingdom, where a stamp duty
on transactions is levied, ‘contracts in differences’ are used to avoid the tax. The ‘contract
for difference’ is nothing but a financial product which reallocates the income associated
with share of ownership, without changing the ownership itself. However, to mitigate the
incentive for engineering, the tax rate could be set lower than the avoidance costs and tax
authorities could react precisely by incorporating new financial instruments in the tax base
(Schamp, 2011).
Finally, Schamp (2011) notes that national and international legal constraints should
be considered. The underlying belief is that the proposed FTT should be collected by
the host country of the financial infrastructure on behalf of the international community.
Therefore, at the national level parliamentary authorization to collect the tax is necessary
and a legal scheme should be designed for collection. Besides, compatibility of the FTT with
the European free movement of capital should be assessed.
There is general consensus in the empirical literature on FTT that it distorts market
quality via a reduction in market volume and liquidity, an increase in market volatility
and the cost of capital for firms (Amihud (1993); Umlauf (1993); Jones and Seguin (1997);
Baltagi et al. (2006); Bloomfield et al. (2009); Pomeranets and Weaver (2011)). The study
by Pomeranets and Weaver (2011) examines changes in market quality associated with nine
modifications to the New York State Securities Transaction Tax (STT) between 1932 and
1981. They find that the New York FTT increased individual stock volatility, widened bid-
ask spreads, increased price impact, and decreased volume on the New York Stock Exchange.
There is also the example of an FTT in Sweden in 1984. The country introduced a 1% tax
on equity transactions in 1984, which increased to 2% in 1986. The purpose of the tax was
16In the case of a turnover tax, tax paid on inputs ‘sticks’. However, with VAT, a credit is provided for
input tax so as to ensure that, while tax is collected from the seller, it ultimately does not affect businesses’
input prices.
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the same as that of the EU FTT: to raise revenue and to improve the efficiency of the market
by reducing speculation. Umlauf (1993) studies the impact of these changes on the Swedish
market and finds that stock prices and turnover declined after an increase in the rate of
FTT to 2% in 1986. Trading volume fell by 30%, and 60% of the 11 most traded shares
migrated to London to avoid the tax. In 1989, the scope of the tax was broadened to include
bonds, which led to 85% and 98% reductions in bond trading volume and bond derivatives
trading volumes respectively. The tax reduced the liquidity of the market but did not reduce
the volatility, which shows that it had little impact on speculative trading because higher
volatility is generally associated with higher speculative trading.
FTT is likely to adversely affect the repo market. Like other credit markets, there are
borrowers and lenders in a repo market. Borrowers could be dealers who need cash to fund
positions or who want to manage liquidity. Lenders are often central banks or money market
funds. Central banks, who act as a lender of last resort, use the repo market to manage
monetary policy. However, money market funds also frequently invest their surplus cash in
the repo market in the short term. Unlike traditional forms of secured lending, in a repo
transaction the lender has outright legal ownership of the security for a temporary period.
Most transactions are conducted overnight, but there is a market for 1 month, 3 month,
6 month and 12 month repos, or even longer terms. For a borrower, this transaction is
called a repo, while for the lender it is called a reverse repo. Everyday, tens of thousands of
repo transactions are made by European finance houses to manage their short-term liquidity,
in which securities (usually government bonds) are sold for cash. As explained above, the
proposed EU FTT is likely to adversely impact the repo market because of a substantial
increase in the repo rate.
4.2 Financial Activities Tax (FAT)
As an alternative to an FTT, the IMF (2010) proposes the implementation of a FAT levied
on the sum of profits and remuneration of financial institutions. It is believed that since value
added is simply the sum of profits and wages, a FAT would bear the same relationship to an
FTT as VAT does to a turnover tax. A FAT in effect taxes the net transactions of financial
institutions, whereas an FTT taxes gross transactions. However, like an FTT, a FAT would,
in the absence of special arrangements, tax business transactions because no credit would be
given to their customers for a FAT paid by financial institutions. Alternative definitions of
profits and remuneration for inclusion in the base of a FAT would enable it to pursue a range
of objectives.17 For instance, with the inclusion of all remuneration, the IMF (2010) argues
17See Appendix 6 of the IMF (2010) report for elaboration on the design and revenue potential of these
alternative forms of FAT.
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that a FAT would effectively be a tax on value added, and so would partially offset the risk of
the financial sector becoming unduly large because of its favourable treatment under existing
VAT arrangements. Moreover, to avoid worsening distortions, the tax rate would need to
be below current standard VAT rates (for the reasons discussed above, financial services
are commonly VAT-exempt, which means that, purely for tax reasons, the financial sector
may be under-taxed and hence perhaps ‘too big’). In fact, the size of the gross financial
sector value-added in many countries suggests that even a relatively low-rate FAT could
raise significant revenue in a fair and reasonably efficient way. For instance, the IMF (2010)
report shows that in the UK, a 5% FAT (with all salaries included in the base) might raise
about 0.3% of GDP.
Moreover, the IMF (2010) argues that with the inclusion of profits only above some high
threshold rate of return, a FAT would become a tax on ‘excessive’ returns in the financial
sector. The underlying belief is that it would mitigate the excessive risk-taking that can
arise from the undervaluation by private sector decision-makers of losses in bad outcomes
(because they are expected to be borne by others), since it would reduce the after-tax return
in good outcomes.18 It should be noted that there may be more effective (tax and regulatory)
ways to do this.
The IMF (2010) also states that the implementation of a FAT should be relatively
straightforward, as it would be drawn on the practices of established taxes: taxing profits
and withholding on remuneration are everyday functions of almost every tax administration.
Of course, there would be technical issues to resolve, but the IMF argues that most are of a
kind that tax administrations are used to dealing with. In fact, some jurisdictions already
have taxes of this general type. Even though there would be difficulties in the potential
shifting of profits and remuneration to low-tax jurisdictions, a low rate FAT might not add
greatly to current incentives for tax planning, and as a matter of fact would not greatly
change them if adopted at broadly similar rates in a range of countries.
In addition, similar to an FTT, a FAT would tend to reduce the size of the financial
sector; however, with less uncertainty as to its impact on the structure of financial markets,
effective implementation and, to some extent, incidence. Unlike an FTT, a FAT will fall
on intermediate transactions. Therefore its implementation does not directly distort the
activities of the financial institutions. Rather, it encourages integration in the sector. In
fact, since a FAT is essentially a levy on economic rents, it would tend to reduce the size of
the sector without changing its activities.
The IMF (2010) argues that in many respects a FAT has the nature of VAT. This is in
the sense that like VAT, there would be no direct impact on the structure of the activities
18John et al. (1991) develop the argument for progressive profit taxation on these grounds.
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undertaken by financial institutions themselves, as liability depends on profit, not on how it
is earned or on the volume of turnover. Of course, there would be one difference from VAT,
in that the tax would also fall on businesses, not just on final consumers.
Shaviro (2012) also favours a FAT over an FTT because of the broad ‘net’ measure of
FAT compared to a narrow ‘gross’ measure of financial sector activity. The Parliamentary
Commission on Banking Standards PCBS (2013) report also quotes different parties who
prefer a FAT over an FTT for three reasons: it is less easily avoidable through relocations;
incidence is more certain; and it would generate the same amount of revenue with less
inefficiencies.
4.3 Value Added Tax (VAT)
A VAT is a consumption tax that is collected on the value added at each stage of production.
This is different to a retail sales tax (RST), which is charged on sales to final consumers.
In order to understand a VAT (or Government Sales Tax, GST) on financial services, it is
important to distinguish between the purchase of financial services by businesses and con-
sumers. The literature provides the answer that purchases of financial services by businesses
should not be subject to GST, whereas for purchases by consumers the answer is not so
clear. Firth and McKenzie (2012) observe that the non-taxation of intermediate financial
transactions with businesses can be achieved in two fundamental ways. If GST is levied
on the purchase of a financial service, regardless of whether or not the underlying price is
explicit or implicit by way of the margin (and ignoring measurement issues with regard to
the latter for now; this issue will be discussed below), the business should obtain a full input
credit for the GST paid on the service, and the financial institution providing the service
should obtain full credit for the GST paid on the inputs purchased to produce the service. If
no GST is levied on the transaction, then the GST levied on the inputs used by the financial
intermediary to provide the service to businesses should still be fully credited on the part of
the financial intermediary; this is, of course, zero-rating.
It is important to note that it is a very common practice to exempt financial services
from VAT, meaning that the tax is not charged to the purchaser, but tax paid on related
inputs is not recovered. Therefore, in some sense, financial services are ‘input-taxed’. On
one hand, the reason behind the implementation of VAT exemption on financial services
lies in the conceptual difficulty that arises when payment for service is implicit in a spread
(between borrowing and lending rates, for instance): taxing the overall spread may be easy,
but proper operation of the VAT requires some way of allocating that tax between the two
sides of the transaction so as to ensure that registered businesses receive a credit but final
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consumers do not.
While on the other hand, exemption means that business use of financial services tends
to be over-taxed, but use by final consumers is under-taxed. This means that the prices
charged by the financial institutions are likely to reflect the unrecovered VAT charged on
their inputs, so that business users will pay more than they would have in the absence of the
VAT. Generally, the credit mechanism of the VAT ensures that it does not affect prices paid
by registered users on their purchase. However, exemption means that this is not so, either
for financial institutions themselves, or their customers or, through further cascading, the
customers of their customers. Of course, this runs counter to the principle underlying the
VAT, that transactions between businesses should not be taxed unless doing so addresses
some clear market failure. Moreover, exemption for final consumers is likely to mean under-
taxation, since the price they pay does not reflect the full value added by financial service
providers, but only their use of taxable inputs. Why should there be a low rate of VAT on
the use of financial services by financial consumers? Some (Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976);
Mirrlees (2011) (Chapter 6)) argue for taxation of financial services at a relatively low rate
because of their use of free time for paid work, so that favourable treatment helps counteract
the general tendency of taxation to discourage work effort. Since the adoption of the Sixth
VAT Directive in 1977 (Article 135 (1) of the VAT Directive), the EUs common value added
tax system has generally exempted mainstream financial services, including insurance and
investment funds.
The Directive, to some extent, reflects an uncertain approach, in that it allows EU mem-
ber states the option of taxing financial services. However, the difficulty arises of technically
defining the price for specific financial operations. Studies such as those by Kerrigan (2010)
and Mirrlees (2011) (Chapter 8) provide a detailed discussion of the problem of VAT on finan-
cial services, arguing that around two-thirds of all financial services are margin-based, which
makes the implementation of the invoice-credit VAT system very difficult in this respect.
Nevertheless, this difficulty seems to be surmountable. For instance, in Germany, where the
granting of loans is subject to VAT under the option to tax, an acceptable methodology
seems to have been found to tax these margin-based operations.19 Yet, the extent to which
applying VAT to the financial sector (and its clients) would raise additional tax revenues
and, consequently, the extent to which the exemption constitutes a tax advantage for the
financial sector remains an unsettled empirical question. Known as the ‘irrecoverable VAT
problem’, the exemption means that the financial sector does not charge VAT on most of
19Poddar and English (1997) propose the application of a transaction-based VAT known as the ‘Truncated
Cash-Flow Method with Tax Calculation Account’ as another theoretical possibility. Ernst and by European
Commission DG TAXUD) (1996) have considered such alternative approaches.
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its output, so it cannot deduct the VAT charged on its input. Estimates by Genser and
Winker (1997) for Germany (7 billion DM for 1994), Huizinga (2002) for the EU-15 (e 12
billion for 1998 or 0.15% of GDP) and the UK Treasury for the UK (£9.05 billion or about
0.6% of GDP) indicate that there might be a sizeable tax advantage (measured as VAT not
collected).20 Arguments are also put forth that claim that irrecoverable VAT is the largest
tax burden for the sector.
The EC (2011) report presents a new estimate of the magnitude of the problem. The
calculations are based on European Sector Accounts on the consumption of financial services
by sectors (data restricted to financial intermediation and other tax exempt financial services
are not covered). By applying methodologies proposed by Huizinga (2002) and Lockwood
(2013), the data are used to estimate the potential advantage from VAT exemption. Al-
though the data are very rough approximations and should be interpreted with caution, the
estimates suggest that VAT exemption leads to an advantage in the range of 0.11% to 0.17%
of GDP (the results are in line with the results of Huizinga (2002) of around 0.15% of GDP).
Nevertheless, the results indicate that the VAT exemption of financial services might be an
advantage for the financial sector. The EC (2011) report notes that the results do not change
significantly when other estimates for the irrecoverable VAT based on sector account data
are used.
It should further be noted that all three estimates do not take into account the be-
havioural response due to price changes when applying VAT to financial services. Although
the inclusion of the financial sector in VAT would indeed lead to price changes, such changes
should be seen as the correction to an existing distortion rather than a new distortion. The
reason is that next to the question of whether VAT on financial services would raise revenues,
there is an economic distortion arising from the current VAT exemption. While services pro-
vided to households are too cheap, services to businesses are more expensive, leading to a
misallocation of the consumption of financial services.
Moreover, it can be deduced (following IMF (2010)), that the net impact of exemption
is likely to be less tax revenue and a larger financial sector. Evidence suggests that revenue
would be increased by only taxing the final use of financial services at the standard VAT
rate (Huizinga (2002); Genser and Winker (1997)). At the same time, the effect on the
size of the sector depends on the relative price sensitivities of business and final use, even
though the same evidence creates some presumption that the exemption of many financial
services under current VAT results in the financial sector being larger than it would be under
a perfectly functioning, single rate VAT.
Other arguments are put forward by different studies; for example, Grubert and III (2000)
20http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/tax_expenditures/table1-5.pdf
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argue that financial services are not purchased for their consumption value, but rather to
facilitate final consumption and should not be taxed. Boadway and Keen (2003) argue that
many goods and services that one would question should be taxed using a GST. They have
a similar characteristic because they are a means to an end rather than ends in themselves,
and are therefore intermediate transactions. Indeed, virtually every good may be thought of
in those terms, in the sense that they are inputs into some notion of well-being or production
process, but the idea of VAT is to concentrate on the value added. As per the Corlett and
Hague (1953) rule, to minimize the costs of distortions caused by the tax system, goods
that are more complementary with the consumption of leisure (which is generally viewed as
being non-taxable) should be taxed at higher rates. Since financial services are exempt from
VAT, they are implicitly considered equivalent to a necessity, with a view not to pass on
the tax burden to the final consumers. In summary, VAT exemption possibly results in the
preferential treatment of the financial sector compared with other sectors of the economy,
as well as in distortions of prices. Therefore, VAT exemption for a large share of financial
services is an important issue.
Nevertheless, the cases of New Zealand and Australia have widely been put forward as a
more efficient and a fair model, which seems to avoid some of the potential distortive impacts
of the implementation of VAT. New Zealand introduced a uniform GST in 1986 (VAT is called
GST in New Zealand) and considered it efficient because of relatively fewer exemptions than
in the UK and the EU. Dickson and White (2012) describe the compliance and administrative
costs of GST as regressive; however, relief to the poor strata of society is provided via the
income tax and social welfare systems. As reported by PWC in their survey in 2006, in New
Zealand, although exemption is afforded to many supplies of financial services, these supplies
can be zero rated (at the option of the supplier) when made to principally taxable persons.21
This guarantees that financial service providers can recover a substantial or significant GST
incurred on inputs purchased from third-party suppliers.
In addition, it is interesting to note that in New Zealand GST exemption does not include
non-life insurance, provision of advisory services, equipment leasing, creditor protection poli-
cies and some other financial intermediation services. However, transactions dealing with
money, issuance of securities, provision of credit and loans and provision of life insurance are
still exempted (Poddar and Kalita, 2008). The New Zealand system of taxation of non-life
insurance would seem to have been followed in a number of other countries, including South
Africa and Australia, and very broadly it taxes gross premiums but gives insurers the abil-
ity to reclaim deemed input tax on indemnification of payments, whether or not made to
21See GST Guidelines for Working with New Zero Rating Rules for Financial Services, published by the
policy advice division of the Inland Revenue Department (New Zealand), October 2004.
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GST-registered insured parties.22 In this case, the model uses taxes on insurers’ cash flows
as a surrogate for value added.
The narrow definition of financial services, in the form of BTB or BTC transactions,
has made many of them taxable, which otherwise would have been exempt. The exemption
does not apply to brokering and facilitating services; it includes only borrowing and lending.
With respect to Australia, the exemption approach to financial services applies in principle
so that a denial of input credit entitlement arises for GST incurred on related costs. In
spite of this, the distortive impact of the input credit provision is mitigated by what is
termed the Reduced Input Tax Credit (RITC) scheme. This scheme, a unique feature of
the Australian GST code, allows suppliers of financial services to recover 75% of tax paid
on specified inputs. A relative of a RITC was chosen because of the significant proportion
of labour costs typically incurred in providing the RITC services. The main objective of the
RITC scheme is to eliminate the bias to vertical integration (self-supplying inputs) and to
facilitate outsourcing, presumably from a cost efficiency perspective. The inputs that give
rise to an RITC are itemized in regulations, but broadly include the following: 1. Transaction
banking and cash management services; 2. Payment and fund transfer services; 3. Securities
transaction services; 4. Loan services; 5. Debt collection services; 6. Funds management
services; 7. Insurance brokerage and claims handling services; 8. Trustee and custodial
services; and 9. Suppliers for which financial supply facilitators are paid a commission.
A PWC (2006) report identifies certain advantages and disadvantages associated with
the implementation of the RITC mechanisms.
Advantages of the Australian RITC scheme are:
1. It removes the necessity to make supplies to financial institutions VAT exempt. Hence,
tax compliance is easier for suppliers to these institutions, which remain fully taxable;
2. It is the recipients’ responsibility to determine the RITC rather than placing the burden
on the suppliers; and
3. The RITC scheme is compatible with the existing VAT framework (i.e. direct attri-
bution and allocation). For instance, the RITC can apply to supplies used for taxable
and exempt purposes. The recipient then works out the extent of taxable use (an
apportionment is made) and then applies the reduced input tax credit to the extent of
exempt use. To put this in figures, if an entity makes 50% taxable and 50% exempt
22The Value Added Tax Act, no 89 of 1991, states that various financial services are exempt from VAT, for
example long term insurance (sec 2(1)(i) and sec 12(a)). Yet short term insurance and commission received
from selling long term and short term insurance are taxable supplies and subject to VAT at 14%.
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supplies, then it can claim back 87.5% of the GST incurred by applying RITC (say
75%) to the remaining 50% exempt use PWC (2006).
Disadvantages of the Australian RITC regime are:
1. Clear definitions and guidance are needed to identify when the RITC will apply and
to what kinds of goods/services;
2. The Australian RITC mechanism requires unanimous support from all States and
Territories before the law can be amended. A similar principle applies in the EU;
3. Before an RITC can be applied, an apportionment is required to overhead expenditure;
4. It is the recipient that makes an apportionment between taxable and exempt use and
then applies the RITC, thereby allowing an RITC to manipulate the apportionment
in favour of taxable use to maximize input VAT recovery;
5. RITC does not apply to all services that may lead to irrecoverable input VAT. For
instance, it may not apply to the recharge of shared service centre costs from a group
company (but outside the GST Group);
6. There is no scientific way of determining RITC, as the credit of 75% was chosen after
consultation with the industry. Hence, it is difficult to know what the correct RITC
should be. In any case, it was agreed that if the service was provided in-house, there
should be a GST cost on overheads and some directly attributable costs, and therefore
a 100% credit would be inappropriate.
It is worth mentioning that although some of these services may qualify for exemption
in their own right under the Sixth EU VAT Directive, the RITC scheme is an interesting
concept and may contribute to the elimination of the bias against outsourcing inherent in
other systems.
Financial services are also exempt from VAT in the EU and banks do not charge any
VAT on their financial services, nor do they not recover VAT paid on their business inputs.
However, there are some exceptions of specified fee-based services, such as safety deposit
box fees, financial advisory services and the zero rating of exported financial services. The
Canadian Goods and Services Tax is generally similar to the European one with regard
to exemption of financial services. However, there is a list of fee-based services that are
taxed.23 The GST is a credit-invoice tax rather than a subtraction method tax, which was
once proposed in Canada (Schenk, 2010).
23GST/HST Memoranda Series, Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, April 2000.
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The cases of Israel and Argentina are severe, in the sense that they overtax many financial
services. Firstly, financial services are exempt from VAT, meaning that they cannot recover
the tax on their purchases and secondly, banks are required to pay tax on the aggregate
of their wages and profits (Schenk and Oldman, 2007). In order to contain inflationary
pressures, or for that matter to reduce the wasteful use of financial services, Argentina taxes
gross interest on loans under a VAT at different rates. The VAT on these loans to registered
businesses is creditable (Schenk and Oldman, 2007).
Virtually all fee-based financial services are taxable or zero-rated under VAT in South
Africa. However, margin-based services are still exempted. The banks can reclaim input
VAT for fee-based services. In Singapore, financial services rendered to taxable customers
are zero rated because financial institutions can claim input credits for VAT. For input VAT
that is not attributable to taxable supplies or to exempt supplies, a financial service provider
must allocate the input tax in proportion to the ratio of taxable supplies to total supplies
(Schenk and Oldman, 2007).
4.3.1 Effects of Removing VAT exemption on Financial Services
As noted in the Mirrlees (2011) review, exemption from VAT is against the logic of the
tax as it breaks down the chain, leaving financial institutions (or any other institution for
that matter) to reclaim the input tax. It is clearly distortionary, as exemption makes VAT
a production tax. Perhaps the biggest distortion is that it forces financial institutions to
produce most of the inputs in-house and integrate vertically. This thereby reduces input
VAT that is not creditable for financial institutions. In addition to the discrimination against
outside suppliers, vertical integration could perhaps be the reason why financial institutions
take the shape of conglomerates, making them ‘too big to fail’. As financial institutions
across the EU face different input costs, exemption creates another distortion, leaving the
financial institutions with higher input costs uncompetitive.
Another distortion identified by (Schenk and Oldman, 2007) is that exemption of financial
services may encourage financial institutions to outsource, which is discrimination against
domestic suppliers. They explain that if a financial institution obtains an exempted service
within the EU, the cost may include some disallowed input VAT. However, this is not the
case if a service is imported from a country with zero-rating on the export of that service.
One of the problems in taxing financial services identified by Benedict (2011) is the val-
uation issue. Apart from some technical problems involved in it, one factor that is desirable
from the risk management point of view is the transparency of banks earnings. It is generally
argued that the tax can be imposed on the interest rate spread and apportioned between
transactors (customers of lending and borrowing). This valuation process would result in a
29
transparency of the margins, not only for the revenue authorities but also for the public at
large. This would reduce the information asymmetries, which are considered to have been
one of the causes of the crisis.
Mirrlees (2010) review does not clearly distinguish financial services from other major
areas (property and PNC) where VAT is not optimal. Nevertheless, it suggests Viable
Integrated VAT (VIVAT) as a solution for the UK and the EU. VIVAT proposes that all
sales to registered businesses are taxed at a uniform ‘intermediate’ rate of 17.5%. However,
Cnossen (2010), commenting on Crawford et al. (2010) chapter on VAT in the Mirrlees (2010)
Review, argues that VIVAT involves substantial additional administrative complexity and
may violate tax autonomy. It leads to a break in the VAT-audit trail, making it difficult
to control compliance. Dickson and White (2010), in their commentary, consider a uniform
standard rate of 17.5% a step in the right direction. Given the regressive compliance cost of
GST, they are of the view, because of basic necessities of life, that the economic position of
the poor should be adjusted via income taxation and social welfare provisions, rather than
GST exemption.
Broadly speaking, there are two methods of VAT charging: the subtraction method and
the credit-invoice method. The subtraction method exists in Japan, whereas most countries
(Europe, Australia, New Zealand, Canada etc.) use the credit-invoice method. However,
Toder and Rosenberg (2010) explain that the subtraction method in Japan is not very
different from the credit-invoice method. Under the subtraction method, VAT is calculated
on the difference between the value of sales and the value of purchases. On the other hand,
in the credit-invoice method, sales by businesses are taxable. However, they reclaim the
tax they have paid on their purchases. The credit-invoice method is preferable over the
subtraction method if anyone in the chain is exempted from tax. The credit-invoice method
is further divided into the Cash Flow Method, Cash Flow Method with Tax Collection
Account and Modified Reverse Charge Approach.
The cash flow method is more popular and the simplest method to tackle the valuation
of VAT under credit-invoice tax. Under this method, all cash inflows are treated as sales
to customers and all cash outflows are treated as the purchase of inputs. Consequently,
financial institutions have to pay tax on all purchases (cash outflows) and charge tax on
all sales (cash inflows). Needless to say, financial institutions will reclaim the tax paid on
purchases. Although the cash flow method is simple and straightforward to implement, there
are two difficulties attached to it, but only for margin based services. These are related to
payment of tax at the time of borrowing and transitional adjustments at the beginning of
the system and at the time of tax rate change.
Poddar and English (1997) propose a cash flow method with Tax Collection Account
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(TCA) to resolve the problems attached to this method. They argue that:
“the TCA is a tax suspense account created to obviate the payment of tax by taxpayers
and of credits by government during the period that cash inflows and outflows of a capital
nature occur. Tax that would otherwise be payable/creditable is instead debited/credited to
the TCA and carried forward to the period during which the capital transaction is reversed.
The TCA mechanism thus allows deferral of tax on cash inflows and of tax credits on
cash outflows. However, these deferrals are subject to interest charges at the government
borrowing rate” (Poddar and English, 1997:p.11)
Zee (2004) proposes a ‘modified reverse-charging’ method to tax financial services under
a VAT. This proposal involves:
“the application of a reverse charge that shifts the collection of the VAT on deposit inter-
est from depositors to banks, in conjunction with the establishment of a franking mechanism
managed by banks that effectively transfers the VAT so collected to borrowers as credits
against the VAT on their loan interest on a transaction-by-transaction basis. The proposal
is fully compatible with an invoice-credit VAT and is capable of delivering the correct theo-
retical result at minimal administrative costs” (Zee, 2004:p.3).
Zee claims that this approach delivers the correct theoretical result but entails minimal
administrative costs in terms of either enforcement or compliance. As explained by Kerrigan
(2010), both the TCA and the modified reverse-charge methods provide a workable solution.
However, the TCA method has been field tested with a panel of financial institutions and
has been found workable. Therefore, this method is preferred.
Crawford et al. (2010), in Mirrlees (2010) Review, argue that financial institutions would
need to distinguish between registered and non-registered buyers and suggest VIVAT as
the best solution for the UK and the EU. Keen (2000) also makes the same argument and
compares VIVAT with Compensating VAT (CVAT), explaining that CVAT (which requires
sellers to discriminate between buyers located in different provinces of a federation) is de-
signed for countries like Brazil and India where there is a significant central federal tax
authority.
The removal of exemption on financial services would mean that banks’ 20% (in the case
of the UK) tax on financial products and services would be paid by consumers, and banks
would be allowed to reclaim VAT on inputs, which would reduce their costs. This is good
in the sense that banks would not have to take on risky projects in order to increase their
profits, as they would be able to do so even without taking risks. It would also increase
revenue for the government. The only affected party in the case of removal of exemption
from VAT would be the consumers. They would have to pay an extra 20% for the use of
financial services. It might, however, also improve efficiency because consumers would stop
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excessive use of financial services and use them only when needed. However, zero rating of
financial services increases the burden on the exchequer, while only benefiting the banks.
This policy does not seem to be beneficial given the crisis situation. Currently in New
Zealand there is zero-rating of financial services (excluding issuance of securities, provision
of credit and loans etc.) supplies to businesses and a reverse charge to imported business
services. This helps remove the distortions that arise due to exemption and the fiscal cost
of zero-rating is partially offset by the reverse charge.
It is important to segregate financial services into fee-based services and margin-based
services when removing VAT exemption on them. Fee-based services can be categorized
as a luxury, with margin-based services as a necessity. Therefore, tax on such services
should be levied based on their elasticity of demand. We argued above that an increase
in equity will increase the cost of lending and hence will unfavourably impact the banks,
leaving the smaller ones at a disadvantage. However, the removal of exemption of VAT
would decrease the undue pressure on banks and give them a level playing field, similar to
other companies. As highlighted by Mishkin (2012), increased competition, resulting from
the financial innovation that decreased the profitability of banks, was responsible for the
excessive risk taking by banks which led to the crisis. We therefore support a combination
of both approaches, so that the banks would not be adversely affected by very strict policies,
keeping in mind the tax and regulation heterogeneity that exists across countries and regions.
4.4 A Bank Levy
A bank levy, or tax, can be interpreted as an additional duty imposed on financial insti-
tutions, predominantly banks. Several countries have taken legislative initiatives in this
respect, such as an additional levy applicable to banks which are considered to pose a sys-
temic risk to the economy. Such bank levies are not applied to the profits of the bank (as
the case of CIT), but are in principle levied on its (relevant) assets, liabilities or capital.
For example, countries which chose to apply a levy on liabilities broadly speaking include
Austria (which also covers some aspects of FTT because the tax is also levied on the vol-
ume of derivatives transactions), Belgium (including two other bank taxes explained below),
Cyprus, Germany, Hungary, Iceland (which also taxes remuneration in much the same way as
a FAT), Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Sweden, the Netherlands (the usual rate is multiplied
by a factor of 1.1 if one member of the board receives non-fixed remuneration of more than
25% of fixed income), the UK and the US (both the UK and the US give a 50% discount on
the usual rate for more stable funding resources). On the other hand, the base of the French
bank levy is regulatory capital, while that of Slovenia is total assets. Although these bases
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are clearly related, it shows the focus of the bank tax.
A few countries such as The Netherlands, the UK and the US seem to tax only bigger
banks and liabilities if they are beyond a certain threshold. For example, there is threshold
of e 20 billion in the Netherlands, one of £20 billion in the UK and of $50 billion in the
US. The bank tax in most countries (e.g., Austria, Hungary, France, Iceland, Portugal,
Slovakia, Slovenia, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) contributes to the general
reserve; however, there is a dedicated resolution fund to draw upon in case of a crisis in
some other countries (e.g., Cyprus, Germany, Korea, Romania and Sweden). In the US,
the purpose of the bank tax called the ‘Financial Crisis Responsibility fee’ is different, in
the sense that it is ex-post and is aimed at recovering any direct costs incurred by the
failure of financial institutions under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Belgium
has three different kinds of bank taxes: one similar to the usual bank levies calculated on
total liabilities, which contributes to the Resolution Fund; and a new bank levy which uses
regulated savings deposits as the basis for calculating the tax due, contributing to the deposit
protection fund and the financial stability contribution. Finally, there is a contribution to the
Special Protection Fund for the deposits, life insurances and capital of recognised cooperative
companies, which is calculated taking into account certain risk factors.
Because the bank levy is not being taxed under standard tax treaties, there is a risk of
double taxation. In order to avoid this, the UK, German and French authorities are entering
into a ‘double taxation agreement’, which will allow a proportion of the levy in one country
to be credited against the levy in the other. This agreement has been enacted in the UK
with respect to France from 1 January 2011, which allows a proportion of the French levy
to be credited against the UK one.
In the UK, the treasury secretary has increased the bank levy from 0.105% to 0.13% to
0.142% with effect from 1 January 2014. This is the sixth increase in the levy since it was
introduced in 2010. The Government has lowered the corporate tax rate from 28% to 24%
and then to 22%, which will further decrease to 21% from April 2014. The bank levy was
increased in order to take away the benefit of this reduction from the banking sector and
with a view to raise revenue from it. In the UK, the levy is applicable to global consolidated
balance sheet liabilities less tier 1 capital, protected deposits, sovereign repo liabilities and
derivatives on a net basis. Therefore, an increase in bank levy means that the treasury
secretary is aiming to tax the unsecured borrowings of the banking sector. There seems to
be an overlap between the increase in the bank levy and the proposed Basel III Liquidity
Coverage Ratio (LCR) and Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR). LCR and NSFR incentivize
banks to use more stable funding sources by reducing the reliance on short-term ones.
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5 Conclusions
While several policy measures, including taxes, levies and regulatory measures, have been in
place, and for that matter, many are still under discussion and consideration, the question
of what should truly circumvent the negative micro-prudential externalities stemming from
limited liability and asymmetric information relating to individual institutions and macro-
prudential externalities relating to systemic risk still remains unanswered. More importantly,
the impact of these externalities on the growth and development of several countries remains
a source of worry amongst policy makers, academics, and several national and international
bodies. Macro-prudential supervision is a device for reducing asset price inflation and thus
the need to insure against bank failure via capital ratios and deposit insurance and reso-
lution funds, but again these measures are untried and untested as yet. We highlight the
inconsistencies within the taxation system and also the inconsistencies between the taxation
and regulation with particular focus on banks. We indeed give an overview of different taxes
those are extended to overall financial system but we keep our emphasis limited to banks
with a view to finance resolutions mechanisms and to ensure banking and financial stability.
Current business tax rules encourage excessive debt because of the tax deductibility or
‘expensing’ of interest on debt, in contrast to equity, arguably already ‘double taxed’, div-
idend payments. Tax expensing should perhaps be removed to give debt equal treatment
to equity, at least for banks. However, the increased emphasis on core equity will put the
small saving banks at a disadvantage because they cannot issue equity very easily. In line
with this argument, there is concern about the viability of universal banks. UK’s Indepen-
dent Commission on Banking (ICB, 2011) recommended ‘ring fencing’ retail banking within
universal banks. Ring fencing would impose higher costs on the universal banks and might
encourage some of them to divest their retail banking businesses in pursuit of more risky and
higher RoE generating investment banking and other banking business (Mullineux, 2012).
The UK’s Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards PCBS (2013) highlighted that
whilst ring-fenced banks would carry out the majority of essential economic functions which
need protecting, it is important to be clear that it is these functions that will enjoy protection
and not the bank itself, its shareholders or creditors, other than depositors. There should
be no government guarantee for ring-fenced banks, nor a perception of one, just depositor
protection. Neither does ring fencing mean that risks from non-ring-fenced banks can be
ignored; as such, institutions will remain systemic and difficult to resolve. Based on ICB
(2011) and PCBS (2013) recommendations, the UK passed the Banking Reform Act on 18
December 2013. However, the EU is still considering the Liikanen’s proposal EC (2012) for
limited separation of retail and universal banking. While the Volcker Rule passed in the US
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in December 2013 and UK’s Prudential Regulatory Authority is to consider such a law to
prevent proprietary trading and prevent banks from running hedge funds. Nevertheless, this
is a big and an ongoing issue, attracting proponents and opponents debating on complexity
emanating from universal banking.
The UK Treasury has increased the bank levy for a sixth time since it was introduced
in 2010 to compensate for the benefits banks can enjoy because of the falling corporate tax
rate. The purpose of the bank levy is to tax the unsecured borrowings of the banking sector.
Since the objective of the Basel III Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and Net Stable Funding
Ratio (NSFR) is also to reduce reliance on short-term borrowings, there is potential overlap.
As the stock of non-core liabilities reflects the under-pricing of risk in the financial system,
we are of the view that a levy on non-core liabilities may perhaps mitigate the distortions.
Further developments were made to the Banking Union agreement on 18 December 2013, in
particular with the proposal to use a bank levy to build up, over a few years, the Bank and
Recovery Fund to protect taxpayer-funded bank bailouts. We propose that the UK use its
levy to take similar action.
The empirical literature on a financial transaction tax (FTT), which involves a fixed
levy on the value of a currency or a financial asset (e.g. shares) traded, finds that it can
be distortionary, as it reduces market trading volume and liquidity, and increases market
volatility and the cost of capital for firms. There is the risk of a double ‘taxation’ of liquidity:
one from an FTT and the other from the higher liquidity reserve requirements under Basel
III. Because of the endogenous nature of liquidity, ideally there should be large number of
buyers and sellers of an asset. Because Basel III requires banks to hold more liquidity on their
balance sheets, it will decrease the number of buyers in the market and this situation could
cause difficulties in times when many banks are seeking to sell their liquid assets following a
major event.
Under Basel III, banks must also hold more capital to absorb losses, making them less
risky. This should make it cheaper for them to raise capital and so they may not necessarily
lend significantly less Admati and Hellwing (2013). Furthermore, if the tax distortions
favouring debt over equity are redressed or reversed, with perhaps a bias towards equity
instead, the higher regulatory capital ratios need not lead to lower bank lending in ‘normal’
times. Further, the return on equity (RoE) expected by institutional investors in banks was
arguably excessive ahead of the crisis. Shifting the emphasis toward return on assets (RoA)
is recommended as an alternative. An FTT might offset some of the benefits of cheaper
capital if it leads to an increased cost of the capital. The imposition of an FTT should
thus be adopted with a caution to ensure that it does not counteract the benefit of a higher
capital requirements.
35
The European Commission has proposed an FTT rate of 0.1% on stock and bond trades
and 0.01% on derivatives, on any transaction involving one financial institution with its
headquarters in the tax area, or trading on behalf of a client based in the tax area.24 The
UK opposes the proposal and yet already has a stamp duty of 0.5% on the value of shares
and property sold. The UK stamp duty is different from an FTT because it is applicable
to the buying and selling of UK-registered shares only once; however, an FTT is applied to
the gross value at each stage of the settlement chain of a financial transaction. While an
FTT may not sound like much, the cumulative effect of charging each agent in a multi-step
execution process can be substantial. Furthermore, the FTT may seem like a tax on banks,
but it is highly likely that its costs would be passed on to the end investors.
There is a fear that the proposed EU FTT might adversely impact the repo market
because of a substantial increase in the repo cost, as explained above. The central banks,
which act as a lender of last resort, use the repo rate as a key monetary policy instrument.
Such a substantial increase in the cost of doing repo would not only adversely impact the
monetary policy tool of central banks but also seriously hit liquidity management for the
borrower.
The proposed EU FTT is applicable to other non-participating member countries and
to third countries if they are counterparty to financial transaction trading in an FTT zone
jurisdiction. For example, if a UK share is purchased in an FTT member country, this
would be subject to both UK stamp duty and the EU FTT; this is clearly a risk of double
taxation for non-participating member countries. Moreover, the 2010 ‘Mirrlees Review’
Mirrlees (2011)of the UK tax system and the 2010 ‘Henry Tax Review’ Henry et al. (2010)
of the Australian tax system both warn against the inefficiency of transaction taxes resulting
from their distortionary effects.
Financial services are currently ‘exempt’ from Value Added Tax (VAT) in the EU, in-
cluding the UK. Hence, banks cannot reclaim input VAT paid on their purchases. This
non-recoverable VAT is one of the most significant taxes paid by banks and puts them at a
disadvantage, which might lead them to taking excessive risk in search of profits and even
engaging in illegal activities, such as the mis-selling of Payment Protection Insurance (PPI)
and manipulation of LIBOR. The elimination of this exemption of VAT on financial services
and the segregation of fee-based services and interest margin-based services is proposed. The
removal of the exemption would increase revenue for the government, but consumers would
have to pay additional taxes on the use of financial services. This might increase efficiency
because it would discourage wasteful use of these services. Furthermore, it would also stop
vertical integration of financial institutions, reinforcing their ‘bigness’, as they would not
24An FTT in France has already existed since 1 August 2012 and one in Italy since 1 March 2013.
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have any incentive to raise supplies in-house. Given the operational difficulties linked to
the removal of exemption from VAT, the cash flow method with a Tax Collection Account
(TCA) proposed by Poddar and English (1997) is recommended because this method was
field tested with a panel of financial institutions and was found workable.
Because of operational difficulties attached to levying VAT on margin based financial
services, FAT is sometimes given as an alternative solution. As value added is equivalent
to the wages plus profits of an institution, a FAT would serve as a tax on value added. A
FAT is also preferred over an FTT because it is less easily avoidable through relocations;
its incidence is more certain and it would generate the same amount of revenue with fewer
inefficiencies. A FAT is also considered to be a broad ‘net’ measure of a VAT compared to
an FTTs narrow ‘gross’ measure of financial sector activity.
International co-operation has never been felt to be so important than at the present
time. Besides, new instruments are clearly required, and action is also needed to reduce
current tax distortions that run counter to regulatory and stability objectives. Specifically,
pervasive tax bias in favour of debt financing could be addressed by any of a range of reforms
to corporate income tax, such as allowance for corporate equity, as several countries have
done.
Moreover, as highlighted by the IMF (2010) report, the implementation of several dis-
cussed tax and regulatory measures needs to be coordinated with that of the wider regulatory
reform agenda, and the effects on the wider economy need to be carefully assessed. So far,
regulatory and tax policies towards the financial sector have been formed largely indepen-
dently of each other. Therefore, a more holistic approach is needed to ensure that they are
properly aligned in both the incentives and the overall burden they imply for the sector.
Importantly, reforms needs to be carefully designed so as to not harm the industry’s
ability to rebuild a capital base, and to ensure that shadow banking or other distortions
are not encouraged by over-regulation or over-taxing some parts of the financial sector,
especially in developing countries. Given the internationalization of the financial sector, and
the growing importance of multinationals in the growth and development process, tax and
regulatory measures need to be carefully designed so as not to encourage arbitrage activities,
but at the same time to ensure a smooth pattern and flow of investment and trading activities
between countries. While forming new tax and regulatory measures and at the same time
attempting to co-ordinate with the wider regulatory agenda internationally, the importance
of existing ‘heterogeneity’ across countries should not be ignored.
37
References
Acharya VV, Pedersen LH, Philippon T, Richardson M (2010). “Measuring Systemic Risk.”
Working Paper 1002, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
Admati A, Hellwing M (2013). The Bankers’ New Clothes - What’s Wrong with Banking
and What to do about It. Princeton University Press.
Adrian T, Brunnermeier MK (2008). “CoVaR.” Staff Reports 348, Federal Reserve Bank of
New York.
Amihud Y (1993). “Transaction Taxes and Stock Values.” In K Lehn, R Kamphuis (eds.),
“Modernizing U.S. Securities Regulation: Economic and Legal Perspective,” pp. 477–500.
Irwin.
Arbela´ez MA, Burman LE, Zuluaga S (2005). “The Bank Debit Tax in Colombia.” In
RM Bird, JM Poterba, J Slemrod (eds.), “Fiscal Reform in Colombia,” Cambridge: MIT
Press.
Atkinson AB, Stiglitz JE (1976). “The Design of Tax Structure: Direct versus Indirect
Taxation.” Journal of Public Economics, 6(1-2), 55–75.
Auerbach AJ, Gordon RH (2002). “Taxation of Financial Services under a VAT.” American
Economic Review, 92(2), 411–416.
Baltagi B, Li D, Li Q (2006). “Transaction Tax and Stock Market Behavior: Evidence from
an Emerging Market.” Empirical Economics, 31(2), 393–408.
Beck T, Demirgu¨c-Kunt A, Maksimovic V (2008). “Financing Patterns Around the World:
Are Small Firms Different?” Journal of Financial Economics, 89(3), 467–487.
Bloomfield R, O’Hara M, Saar G (2009). “How Noise Trading Affects Markets: An Experi-
mental Analysis.” Review of Financial Studies, 22(6), 2275–2302.
Boadway R, Keen M (2003). “Theoretical Perspectives on the Taxation of Capital Income
and Financial Services.” In P Honohan (ed.), “Taxation of Financial Intermediation,” pp.
31–80. World Bank and Oxford University Press.
Bond S, Hawkins M, Klemm A (2004). “Stamp Duty on Shares and its Effect on Share
Prices.” IFS Working Papers W04/11, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
Calomiris CW (2013). “Should Big Banks be Broken Up?” The Economist.
Ceriani V, Manestra S, Ricotti G, Sanelli A, Zangari E (2011). “The Tax System and the
Financial Crisis.” Occasional Paper 85, Banca d’Italia.
Cnossen S (2010). “Commentary on I. Crawford, M. Keen and S. Smith, ‘Value Added Tax
and Excises’.” In J Mirrlees, S Adam, T Besley, R Blundell, S Bond, R Chote, M Gammie,
P Johnson, G Myles, J Poterba (eds.), “Dimensions of Tax Design: The Mirrlees Review,”
pp. 370–386. Oxford University Press.
38
Corlett WJ, Hague DC (1953). “Complimentarity and the Excess Burden of Taxation.”
Review of Economic Studies, 21, 21–30.
Cortez B, Vogel T (2011). “A Financial Transaction Tax for Europe.” EC Tax Review,
20(1), 16–29.
Cosimano TF, Hakura D (2011). “Bank Behavior in Response to Basel III: A Cross-Country
Analysis.” IMF Working Papers 11/119, International Monetary Fund.
Coulter B, Mayer C, Vickers J (2012). “Taxation and Regulation of Banks to Manage Sys-
temic Risk.” Finance Working Paper 341/2013, European Corporate Governance Institute
(ECGI).
Crawford I, Keen M, Smith S (2010). “Added Tax and Excises.” In J Mirrlees, S Adam,
T Besley, R Blundell, S Bond, R Chote, M Gammie, P Johnson, G Myles, J Poterba (eds.),
“Dimensions of Tax Design: The Mirrlees Review,” pp. 275–362. Oxford University Press.
Crockett A (2000). “Marrying the Micro- and Macro-prudential Dimensions of Financial
Stability.” Technical report, Bank for International Settlements.
de Mooij RA, Keen M, Orihara M (2013). “Taxation, Bank Leverage, and Financial Crises.”
IMF Working Papers 13/48, International Monetary Fund.
de Nicolo G, Gamba A, Lucchetta M (2012). “Capital Regulation, Liquidity Requirements
and Taxation in a Dynamic Model of Banking.” IMF Working Papers 12/72, International
Monetary Fund.
Dickson I, White D (2010). “Commentary on I. Crawford, M. Keen and S. Smith, Value
Added Tax and Excises.” In J Mirrlees, S Adam, T Besley, R Blundell, S Bond, R Chote,
M Gammie, P Johnson, G Myles, J Poterba (eds.), “Dimensions of Tax Design: The
Mirrlees Review,” pp. 387–406. Oxford University Press.
Dickson I, White D (2012). “Tax Design Insights from the New Zealand Goods and Services
Tax (GST) Model.” Working Papers 60, University of Wellington.
EC (2010). “Financial Sector Taxation.” Taxation Papers 25, Directorate General Taxation
and Customs Union, European Commission.
EC (2011). “Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common System of Financial Transaction
Tax and Amending Directive 2008/7/EC.” Report, EC.
EC (2012). “Banking Structural Reform (follow-up to the Liikanen report).” Technical
report, European Commission.
Egger PH, Eggert W, Keuschnigg C, Winner H (2010). “Corporate Taxation, Debt Financing
and Foreign-plant Wwnership.” European Economic Review, 54(1), 96–107.
Egger PH, von Ehrlich M, Radulescu D (2012). “How Much it Pays to Work in the Financial
Sector.” CESifo Economic Studies, 58(1), 110–139.
39
Engel E, Erickson M, Maydew EL (1999). “Debt Equity Hybrid Securities.” Journal of
Accounting Research, 37(2), 249–274.
Ernst, by European Commission DG TAXUD) YC (1996). “Value Added-Tax: A Study of
Methods of Taxing Financial and Insurance Services.” Taxation Studies 0002, Directorate
General Taxation and Customs Union, European Commission.
Firth M, McKenzie K (2012). “The GST And Financial Services: Pausing For Perspective.”
SPP Research Papers 29, University of Calgary.
Genser B, Winker P (1997). “Measuring the Fiscal Revenue Loss of VAT Exemption in
Commercial Banking.” Public Finance Analysis, 54(4), 563–585.
Grubert H, III JBMI (2000). “Must Financial Services be Taxed Under a Consumption
Tax?” National Tax Journal, 53(n.1), 23–40.
Gu GW, de Mooij RA, Poghosyan T (2012). “Taxation and Leverage in International Bank-
ing.” IMF Working Papers 12/281, International Monetary Fund.
Hanson SG, Kashyap AK, Stein JC (2011). “A Macroprudential Approach to Financial
Regulation.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 25(1), 3–28.
Hart O, Zingales L (2009). “To Regulate Finance: Try the Market.” Foreign Policy.
Henry K, Harmer J, Piggott J, Ridout H, Smith G (2010). “Australia’s Future Tax System.”
Technical report, Australian Government.
Hines JR, Jr RGH (1990). “Coming Home To America: Dividend Repatriations By U.S.
Multinationals.” In A Razin, J Slemrod (eds.), “Taxation in the Global Economy,”
Chicago: University of Chicago.
Huizinga H (2002). “A European VAT on Financial Services?” Economic Policy, 17(35),
497–534.
Huizinga H, Laeven L, Nicodeme G (2008). “Capital Structure and International Debt
Shifting.” Journal of Financial Economics, 88(1), 80–118.
Hull J (2012). Risk Management and Financial Institution. Pearson Education Inc., New
Jersey.
ICB (2011). “Final Report Recommendations.” Technical report, UK government.
IMF (2009). “Debt Bias and Other Distortions: Crisis-related Issues in Tax Policy.” Technical
report, Fiscal Affairs Department, International Monetary Fund.
IMF (2010). “A Fair and Substantial Contribution by the Financial Sector: Final Report
for the G-20.” Technical report, International Monetary Fund.
John K, John T, Senbet L (1991). “Risk-shifting Incentives of Depository Institutions: A
New Perspective on Federal Deposit Insurance Reform.” Journal of Banking and Finance,
15, 895–915.
40
Jones CM, Seguin PJ (1997). “Transaction Costs and Price Volatility: Evidence from Com-
mission Deregulation.” American Economic Review, 87(4), 728–37.
Keen M (2000). “VIVAT, CVAT, and All That - New Forms of Value-Added Tax for Federal
Systems.” Working Papers 00/83, International Monetary Fund.
Keen M (2011). “Rethinking the Taxation of the Financial Sector.” CESifo Economic
Studies, 57(1), 1–24.
Kerrigan A (2010). “The Elusiveness of Neutrality. Why is it so Difficult to Apply VAT to
Financial Services?” MPRA Paper 22748, University Library of Munich, Germany.
Klemm A (2007). “Allowances for Corporate Equity in Practice.” CESifo Economic Studies,
53(2), 229–262.
Lockwood B (2013). “How should financial intermediation services be taxed?” Working
Papers 1309, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation.
Mills LF, Newberry KJ (2004). “Do Foreign MultinationalsTax Incentives Influence Their
U.S. Income Reporting and Debt Policy?” National Tax Journal, 57(1), 89–107.
Mirrlees J (2010). Dimensions of Tax Design: The Mirrlees Review. Oxford University
Press.
Mirrlees J (2011). Tax By Design: The Mirrlees Review. Oxford University Press.
Mishkin FS (2012). Economics of Money, Banking, and Financial Markets. Prentice Hall.
Modigliani F, Miller MH (1958). “The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory
of Investment.” American Economic Review, 48(3), 261–297.
Mullineux AW (2012). “Taxing Banks Fairly.” International Review of Financial Analysis,
25(C), 154–158.
Mullineux AW (2013). “Banking for the Public Good.” International Review of Financial
Analysis, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2013.11.001.
OECD (2007). “Fundamental Reform of Corporate Income Tax.” Technical report, Organi-
zation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris.
PCBS (2013). “Changing Banks for Good.” Technical report, UK government.
Perotti E, Suarez J (2009). “Liquidity Risk Charges as a Macroprudential Tool.” CEPR
Policy Insight 40, CEPR.
Philippon T, Reshef A (2009). “Wages and Human Capital in the U.S. Financial Industry:
1909-2006.” NBER Working Papers 14644, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Poddar S, English M (1997). “Taxation of Financial Services Under a Value-Added Tax:
Applying the Cash-Flow Approach.” National Tax Journal, 50(1), 89–111.
41
Poddar S, Kalita J (2008). “Treatment of Financial Services under the UAE VAT.” Working
papers, Dubai Economic Council.
Pomeranets A, Weaver DG (2011). “Security Transaction Taxes and Market Quality.” Work-
ing Papers 11-26, Bank of Canada.
Princen S (2010). How Does a Tax Allowance for Corporate Equity Affect Capital Structure:
An Empirical Evaluation. Master’s thesis, Louvain School of Management.
PWC (2006). “Economic Effects of the VAT Exemption for Financial and Insurance Ser-
vices.” Report to the european commission, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC).
Schamp L (2011). The Challenge of Designing a Financial Sector Tax. Master’s thesis,
Maastricht University.
Schenk A, Oldman O (2007). Value Added Tax: A Comparative Approach. Cambridge
University Press.
Schenk AS (2010). “Taxation of Financial Services (Including Insurance) Under a United
States Value Added Tax.” Tax Law Review, 63(2), 409–442.
Schmidt R (2007). “The Currency Transaction Tax: Rate and Revenue Estimates.” Technical
report, The North-South Institute, Ontario, Canada.
Schulmeister S (2011). “A General Financial Transaction Tax Motives, Revenues, Feasibility
and Effects.” In “Brussels Tax Forum on March 28 and 29, 2011,” .
Schulmeister S, Schratzenstaller M, Picek O (2008). “A General Financial Transaction Tax
Motives, Revenues, Feasibility and Effects.” Working papers series, WIFO.
Schwert GW, Seguin PJ (1993). “Securities Transaction Tax: An Overview of Costs, Benefits
and Unresolved Questions.” Financial Analysts Journal, 49, 27–35.
SEC (2013). “Volcker-type Rule.” Technical report, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion.
Shaviro D (2011). “The 2008 Financial Crisis: Implications for Income Tax Reform.” Tech-
nical Report 09-35, NYU Law and Economics Research Paper.
Shaviro D (2012). “The Financial Transaction Tax versus the Financial Activities Tax.”
Technical Report 12-04, NYU Law and Economics Research Paper.
Shin HS (2011). “Macroprudential policies beyond Basel III.” In B for International Settle-
ments (ed.), “Macroprudential regulation and policy,” volume 60 of BIS Papers chapters,
pp. 5–15. Bank for International Settlements.
Spratt S (2006). “A Sterling Solution: Implementing a Stamp Duty on Sterling to Finance
International Development.” A report for stamp out poverty, Intelligence Capital Limited,
London.
42
Staderini A (2001). “Tax Reforms to Influence Corporate Financial Policy: The Case of the
Italian Business Tax Reform of 1997-98.” Temi di discussione (Economic working papers)
423, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
Taleb NN (2010). The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable. Random House
Publishing Group.
Toder E, Rosenberg J (2010). “Effects of Imposing a Value-Added Tax to Replace Payroll
Taxes or Corporate Taxes.” Report, Tax Policy Centre, Urban Institute and Brookings
Institution.
Umlauf SR (1993). “Transaction Taxes and the Behavior of the Swedish Stock Market.”
Journal of Financial Economics, 33(2), 227–240.
UN (2010). “Report of the Secretary-General’s High-level Advisory Group on Climate
Change Financing.” Working papers series, New York: United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
Weichenrieder A, Klautke T (2008). “Taxes and the Efficiency Costs of Capital Distortions.”
CESifo Working Paper Series 2431, CESifo Group Munich.
Weitzman ML (1974). “Prices versus Quantities.” Review of Economic Studies, 41(4),
477–491.
Zee HH (2004). “A New Approach to Taxing Financial Intermediation Services Under a
Value-Added Tax.” Working Papers WP/04/119, International Monetary Fund.
Zhou C (2010). “Are Banks Too Big to Fail? Measuring Systemic Importance of Financial
Institutions.” International Journal of Central Banking, 6(34), 205–250.
43
